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A STUDY OF LONG-LIVED ASSET IMPAIRMENT UNDER U.S. GAAP AND IFRS
WITHIN THE U.S. INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT
In this paper, we explore whether differences in accounting standards influence reporting behavior
within the U.S. institutional environment where both IFRS and U.S. GAAP are used for reporting
purposes. To examine this issue, we focus on the accounting for impairment of long-lived assets,
an area where significant differences exist between U.S. GAAP and IFRS. We identify all firms
listed in the U.S. who have recognized long-lived asset impairment losses during the 2004 to 2012
period. From these firms, we identify firms following IFRS, and then develop a matched sample
of U.S. GAAP firms, using a propensity score matching procedure. We examine the relation
between impairment loss and unexpectedly high or low earnings in the year of impairment using
a two-stage Heckman regression model, controlling for industry, country, year of write-down, and
firm-level economic factors. We find that the association between impairment losses and
unexpectedly high and low earnings is significantly higher for U.S. GAAP firms as compared to
IFRS reporting firms, implying differences in accounting standards influence firm financial
reporting. Our findings are robust to alternative measures of country level institutional factors and
macro-economic variables, as well as inclusion of asset impairment reversals.

Keywords: Long-lived asset write-downs, asset impairments, IFRS, U.S. GAAP.

I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has taken major steps
towards the acceptance of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). In 2007, the SEC
eliminated the requirement for foreign private issuers using IFRS as issued by the International
Accounting Standards Board (IASB) to reconcile IFRS financial statements to U.S. GAAP. Thus,
investors and financial statement users in the U.S. need to be familiar with the interpretation of
both IFRS and U.S. GAAP financial statements. Further, in 2010 the SEC expressed support for
the continuing convergence of U.S. GAAP and IFRS (SEC Release No. 33-9109). While the U.S.
GAAP and IFRS accounting models are similar in many respects, significant differences remain
(SEC Staff Paper - Final Report, 2012) and the effect of these differences on reporting behavior
within the U.S. institutional environment is unclear.
Prior cross-national research provides evidence that a weak reporting environment has a
stronger influence on firm reporting behavior than do exogenously determined high quality
accounting standards (Ball, Robin and Wu 2003; Burgstahler, Hail and Leuz 2006; Daske, Hail,
Leuz and Verdi 2008). Within the U.S., pre-2007 research provides evidence that a strong
reporting environment may not constrain the earnings management behavior of firms from weak
home country reporting regimes (Lang, Raedy and Wilson 2006). While prior research offers
insight on the relation between reported earnings and the institutional environment it does not
address the effect of differences between high quality accounting standards within a strong
reporting environment. Given that foreign private issuers may now report in accordance with IFRS
within the U.S. it is important to understand the effect of specific differences between U.S. GAAP
and IFRS standards on reporting behavior.
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One area of continuing difference is the accounting for impairment of long-lived assets (SEC
Staff Paper - Final Report, 2012). In this paper, we examine whether the differences in accounting
standards on impairment of long-lived assets, other than goodwill, under U.S. GAAP (ASC 36010-35) and under IFRS (IAS 36) influence firms’ reporting behavior in the U.S. Understanding
the effect of the differences in these accounting standards, if any, provides insight to standardsetters and regulators, as well as to financial statement users seeking to understand the influence
of accounting standards and the implications of asset write-downs on a firm’s reported earnings.
While both U.S. GAAP and IFRS require assumptions and estimates that provide firms’
flexibility in determining the amount and timing of the write-down, two significant differences
exist between the asset impairment standards that could influence the reporting behavior of firms.1
The first is the U.S. GAAP recoverability test and the second is the reversal of impairment losses
allowed under IFRS but prohibited under U.S. GAAP. Research of long-lived asset impairments,
other than goodwill, in the 1990’s in the U.S. observed indications of firms recording asset writedowns in periods of unexpectedly low earnings suggesting “big bath” reporting behavior (Riedl
2004). Research has also observed income smoothing and “big bath” reporting behavior in nonU.S. listed firms reporting under IAS 36 in specific country settings (Siggelkow and Zülch 2013;
Duh, Lee and Lin 2009).
However, while research suggests that reporting incentives within specific institutional
environments are more important to accounting quality than accounting standards (Ball, Robin and
Wu 2003; Burgstahler, Hail and Leuz 2006), very little research examines the behavior of firms
using IAS 36 in the U.S. institutional setting. Nor has a study compared the reporting of firms
under ASC 360-10-35 and IAS 36 within one country’s institutional setting.

1

We discuss other less fundamental differences between the standards such as, impairment indicators and the
specifics of the calculation of the amount of the impairment loss, in the Background and Prior Research section.
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In order to examine the reporting behavior of firms following the two asset impairment
standards, we identify all U.S. listed firms found in Compustat North America, which includes U.S.
and international firms, who have recognized long-lived asset impairment losses, other than
goodwill, during the 2004 to 2012 period. From these firms we develop a matched sample, using
propensity scores based on firm specific characteristics and year of write-down, of firms reporting
in accordance with U.S. GAAP and firms reporting in accordance with IFRS. We compare these
firms’ long-lived asset impairment losses, earnings, and other firm characteristics using univariate
comparisons. In addition, we use multivariate regression analyses to examine the relation between
impairment loss and unexpectedly high or low earnings in the year of impairment, controlling for
country, industry, size and year. In order to mitigate any potential selection bias for our IFRS
sample, we use the Heckman two-stage specification for our IFRS model. Since the asset
impairment amount is related to a decline in recoverability of a firm’s assets we also control for
economic factors i.e., industry return on assets, firm level sales and operating cash flows.
Our multivariate analysis provides evidence of a significant negative relation between
unexpectedly low earnings (prior to write-downs) and write-downs for firms using U.S. GAAP
during the 2004 through 2012 period suggesting “big bath” reporting behavior. Further, we also
find a significant positive relation between unexpectedly high earnings (prior to write-downs) and
write-downs for U.S. GAAP firms during this same period suggesting income-smoothing behavior.
A comparison of U.S. GAAP reporting firms and U.S. listed IFRS firms reveals that U.S. GAAP
firms have a significantly higher association between write-downs and both unexpectedly low
earnings (prior to write-downs) and unexpectedly high earnings (prior to write-downs) as
compared to IFRS firms. We include alternative measures for country level institutional factors
for the foreign private issuers in our sample with no substantive difference in our findings. Further,
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our findings remain robust when we limit our sample to a comparison of foreign private issuers
using U.S. GAAP reporting standards to foreign private issuers using IFRS.
The strong regulatory and legal environment within the U.S. incentivizes the appropriate
application of accounting standards. Therefore, one interpretation of our findings is that the
application of ASC 360-10-35 results in the appearance of earnings management when that is not
the intent. An alternative explanation is that the two-step test required for determining an
impairment loss under U.S. GAAP allows more discretion in the determination of the timing of
impairment losses. This discretion, when coupled with the inability to reverse impairment losses,
provide U.S. GAAP firms both the opportunity and the incentive to time the reporting of
impairment losses in periods when there is a need to report higher or lower earnings.
We find that the long-lived asset write-down reporting behavior differs between firms
applying U.S. GAAP, ASC 360-10-35, and firms applying IFRS, IAS 36, contributing to our
understanding of the effect of differences in the reporting of U.S. listed firms under IFRS and U.S.
GAAP standards. This evidence implies that accounting standards influence firm reporting
behavior within the U.S. institutional setting. Our findings highlight the differences financial
statement users may encounter in comparing U.S. GAAP and IFRS earnings for U.S. listed firms
with seemingly similar economic conditions and transactions. Further, our evidence implies that
differences in accounting standards are reflected in reporting behavior within strong reporting
environments contributing to the debate on the desirability of global accounting standards.
Our findings also contribute to the asset impairment literature by extending the findings of
Riedl (2004) on firm behavior under U.S. GAAP and extending the IFRS asset impairment
research to the U.S. setting. These findings should be of interest to accounting standard-setters and
regulators as they evaluate the impact of the standards and work to improve them.
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The remainder of the paper proceeds in the following order. Section II provides the
background and prior research. Section III describes the institutional setting and presents the
hypotheses. Section IV describes the sample and presents the method for our analysis. Section V
presents the results and additional tests. We present our conclusions in Section VI.

II. BACKGROUND AND PRIOR RESEARCH
Overview of the U.S. GAAP and IFRS Asset Impairment Standards
Within the U.S., there are separate standards and criteria for the accounting for impairment of
long-lived tangible assets (ASC 360-10-35) and indefinite-lived intangible assets, including
goodwill (ASC 350). Differences in the nature of the intangible asset, the criteria for determining
the impairment loss as well as, a periodic impairment testing requirement for goodwill and other
indefinite-lived intangible assets distinguish the accounting for goodwill and other intangible
assets from long-lived tangible assets. These distinctive differences between the nature and
accounting for indefinite-lived intangible assets and long-lived tangible assets influence the timing
of impairment loss recognition (Banker, Basu and Byzalov 2014; Ramanna and Watts 2012; Li,
Shroff, Venkataraman, and Zhang 2011; Hayn and Hughes 2006). For example, Banker et al. (2014)
provide evidence that short-term economic signals such as sales change and operating cash flow
change, have a greater impact on long-lived tangible assets than on indefinite-lived intangible
assets. In this study, we examine whether there is a difference in the association between current
period income and impairment losses between U.S. GAAP and IFRS. Given our focus on
differences in specific standards and the effect on net income we limit our examination to asset
write-downs associated with long-lived tangible asset impairments (ASC 360-10-35).
The intent of both ASC 360-10-35 and IAS 36 is to provide a method for recognizing losses
when the recoverable amount of a long-lived asset is less than its carrying amount on the financial
6

statements. To meet this objective the standards are similar in that they require management to use
subjective estimates, projections, and assumptions to assess the recoverability of an asset’s
carrying amount. Both standards require the identification of the level at which assets will be tested
for impairment, individually or as an asset group, determination of when to test for impairment,
and the recoverable amount, as well as the measurement and recognition of the impairment loss.
Regardless of these similarities, differences exist within the specific guidance provided by each
standard. For example, IFRS considers changes in market interest rates as an indicator of
impairment whereas U.S. GAAP does not. Further, when determining the asset’s recoverable
amount IFRS provides more specificity on the identification of the discounted cash flows. There
are also differences in the sequence of testing for the impairment of asset groups that have
associated goodwill. Beyond these guidance differences there are two fundamental differences
between the standards that are recognized as being potentially more significant (SEC 2011), the
recoverability test used to identify impairment and the reversal of impairment losses.
U.S. GAAP requires a two-step test for determining an impairment loss. The first step is the
recoverability test, used to identify a recognizable impairment, which requires companies to
compare the carrying amount of a long-lived asset to its undiscounted sum of future cash flows
(ASC 360-10-35-17). The FASB decided to use the undiscounted cash flows in this first step for
“practical reasons” (SFAS 144 ¶B15). It is important to note that the amount of the impairment
loss is not the difference between the carrying value of the asset and the undiscounted future cash
flows, this test is used to determine if a recognizable impairment exists. If the asset does not pass
the recoverability test, the second step requires measurement of the impairment loss, determined
as the difference between the carrying amount and fair value of the asset. The determination of fair
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value should be based on quoted market prices and if those are not available then a discounted
cash flow approach should be used.
The recoverability test is required in ASC 360-10-35 but disallowed in IFRS. IAS 36 uses a
one-step approach for determination of an impairment loss. Under this standard when there is an
indication of impairment the amount of the write-down is calculated as the excess of the asset’s
carrying amount over its recoverable amount. Recoverable amount is defined as the higher of an
asset’s fair value less costs to sell and its value in use. Discounted future cash flows are used in
determining an asset’s value in use. An impairment loss is recognized to the extent that the
recoverable amount of an asset is less than its carrying amount. In considering the measurement
of an asset’s recoverable amount the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC), the
predecessor of the IASB, specifically rejected the proposal that the recoverable amount be based
on undiscounted cash flows. In rejecting this concept the IASC stated that the objective of the
standard is to reflect an investment decision and that “all rational economic transactions take
account of the time value of money” (IAS 36 ¶ BCZ13 (a)). The use of undiscounted cash flows
in the U.S. GAAP recoverability test provides a higher threshold for recognizing an impairment
loss. As such, it may result in a later recognition of losses under U.S. GAAP than under IFRS
(PWC 2013). This implies that assets with similar economics may be recognized differently under
U.S. GAAP and IFRS.
The second fundamental difference is the ability of a firm to reverse previously recognized
impairment losses allowed by IAS 36 but not under U.S. GAAP. Following IAS 36, at the end of
each reporting period companies are required to assess whether there is any indication that a
previously recognized impairment loss no longer exists or has decreased. If the company
determines that there has been an improvement in the asset’s recoverable amount then they may
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reverse the impairment loss. However, IAS 36 specifies that “an impairment loss recognized in
prior periods for an asset other than goodwill shall be reversed if, and only if, there has been a
change in the estimates used to determine the asset’s recoverable amount since the last impairment
loss was recognized” (IAS 36 ¶114). Assuming these requirements are met, the reversal will be
immediately recognized as a gain on the income statement in order to offset the loss originally
recorded on the income statement for the impairment. Although a company may reverse the
impairment loss, the increased carrying amount of the asset must not exceed the carrying amount
of the asset had the impairment loss never been recognized. Thus, a company cannot write the
asset above its original value under the traditional historical cost model.2 U.S. GAAP does not
allow the restoration of previously recognized impairment losses. Therefore, although a company’s
assets are subjected to a less strenuous recoverability test under current U.S. GAAP rules, the
write-down or impairment loss is permanent and cannot be reversed, even if the fair value of the
asset returns to or exceeds its original value.
The fundamental differences between the U.S. GAAP and IFRS asset impairment standards
have the potential to influence the write-down behavior of firm managers. In experimental studies,
Seybert (2010) finds that the possibility of an asset impairment influences managerial behavior
and Trottier (2013) finds that when managers know that an appropriate asset impairment loss can
be reversed when economic conditions justify it, they are significantly more likely to record the
impairment.
Prior Research

2

Under IAS 16, a company may select to use either the cost model or the revaluation model as their accounting policy
for a class of property, plant and equipment. The requirements, for reversal of impairment losses under the revaluation
model, are presented in IAS 36.
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In the U.S., prior to 1995 there was no explicit guidance on the accounting for long-term asset
impairment. Firms applied the general guidance in Statement of Financial Accounting Standard
(SFAS) No. 5 Accounting for contingencies. However concerns over the diversity of practice in
the timing and measurement of impairment losses led the Financial Accounting Standards Board
to issue SFAS 121 Accounting for the impairment of long-lived assets and for long-lived assets to
be disposed of which provides specific guidance and is the basis for the general provisions found
in ASC 360-10-35.3 SFAS 121 was effective for fiscal years beginning after December 15, 1995.
A comprehensive review of the literature examining the effect of write-downs in the pre-SFAS
121 period is provided by Alciatore et al. (1998 and 2000). Given that the change in U.S. GAAP
accounting standards may have affected the magnitude, timing, and managerial incentives related
to write-down amounts, in this paper we focus on research examining the behavior of firms after
the effective date of SFAS 121.
Riedl (2004) compared the association of long-lived asset write-offs with economic factors
and firm behavior before and after SFAS 121. Prior to SFAS 121 two types of earnings
management behavior had been observed with asset write-downs, income smoothing and “big bath”
behavior (Zucca and Campbell 1992). In the context of asset write-downs, income smoothing
describes a firm that in its desire to maintain smooth earnings growth records write-downs in
periods of unusually high earnings. Alternatively, “big bath” behavior describes a firm that records
asset write-downs in a period when it already has lower than expected earnings providing the
opportunity for better future earnings. Writing down an asset ensures that depreciation expense
will be lower and therefore net income higher in future periods.

3

SFAS 121 was superseded in 2001 by SFAS 144 to address the accounting for a business segment that is identified
as a discontinued operation.
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Riedl’s (2004) results, based on a sample of 455 write-off observations from the 1992-1998
period, reveal that write-downs under SFAS 121 have a lower association with economic factors
and a higher association with “big bath” reporting behavior than pre-SFAS 121 write-downs.
Further, Riedl finds that this “big bath” behavior “more likely reflects opportunistic reporting than
managers providing information about their firms’ performance” (p. 849). This is obviously the
opposite effect that the standard is meant to have, yet it is a consistent finding across industry,
macro, and firm-specific variables.
Since the time of Riedl’s (2004) study there has been a significant increase in the amount of
negative special item reporting in the U.S. (Johnson, Lopez, and Sanchez 2011; Fairfield, Kitching,
and Tang 2009). Johnson et al. (2011) find that restructuring charges and long-lived asset writeoffs are of significant importance to the negative special item category, finding that 39 percent of
firms reporting a negative special item from 2001 to 2009 reported one or both of these types of
charges. This increase in occurrence of write-offs combined with the increase in the use of IFRS
for reporting in the U.S. provides a unique opportunity to explore the effect on reporting behavior
of differences between IFRS and U.S. GAAP within a strong institutional environment.
From an international perspective, studies examining the effect of IAS 36 observe the behavior
of firms from specific institutional settings (Siggelkow and Zülch 2013; Duh, Lee and Lin 2009;
Dai, Deng, and Mao 2007; Loh and Tan 2002). While the results of these studies may not be
generalizable to a U.S. setting, we can draw insight from their findings. Dai, Deng, and Mao (2007)
examine the behavior of Chinese listed firms after the adoption of the China Accounting System
for Business Enterprises which aligned Chinese long-lived asset impairment accounting standards
with IFRS. They find evidence of “big bath” reporting behavior concluding that the adoption of
the revised Chinese accounting system provides “more opportunities of manipulating earnings” (p.
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363). Loh and Tan (2002) examine long-lived asset write-down behavior in Singaporean firms that
follow accounting standards aligned with IFRS. Across their analyses of firm-specific and
macroeconomic factors they consistently find that profitability is related to long-lived asset writedowns suggesting earnings management motives.
Similarly, Siggelkow and Zülch (2013) examining write-off decisions of German-listed
companies that report under IFRS, provide evidence indicating income smoothing behavior but
not of “big-bath” reporting behavior. Siggelkow and Zülch believe these findings may be a result
of the German institutional environment which stresses prudence, creditor protection and
minimization of tax payments.
One of the significant ways in which IFRS differs from U.S. GAAP is the ability of firms
applying IFRS to reverse an impairment loss when there are internal or external sources of
information that indicate that the impairment loss has decreased or no longer exists. Management
is required to make this assessment at the end of each reporting period. Trottier (2013) examines
the effect of allowing impairment loss reversals when the asset value recovers, as permitted by
IAS 36, on Canadian managers’ decisions to recognize impairment losses. In the experiment
managers were asked to assess the likelihood of a manager recording an indicated, material
impairment loss. Her results suggest that the ability to reverse an impairment loss significantly
increases the probability that managers will record such a loss.
Duh, Lee and Lin (2009) examine whether Taiwanese listed firms that follow the equivalent
of IAS 36 reverse asset write-downs to manage earnings. Using a sample of firms that reversed
impairment losses they find that companies use periods of strong financial results to create reserves
that can be used to bolster earnings in periods with weak financial results. They also find that this
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income smoothing behavior is more prevalent for firms with higher debt ratios suggesting that
these firms are managing earnings to avoid violation of debt covenants.
Similar to the concept of asset write-down reversals, but using a different set of criteria, IFRS
also allows the upward revaluation of property, plant and equipment to its fair value under the
revaluation model (IAS 16). The revaluation model is not allowed under U.S. GAAP. The limited
research examining IFRS asset revaluations provide evidence that the motives and effects for
revaluations are a function of the institutional setting consistent with the evidence provided in the
cross-national asset impairment studies (Barley, Fried, Haddad and Livnat 2007; Missonier-Piera
2007). For example, Gordon and Hsu (2014) provide evidence that while asset write-offs under
IFRS are more predictive of future cash flows than those under U.S. GAAP, there are differences
in IFRS reporting behavior between firms from strong legal enforcement as compared to low legal
enforcement institutional environments.
Overall, prior research examining reporting under IAS 36 and ASC 360-10-35 provides
evidence that firms are able to manipulate earnings through asset impairments within specific
country settings. Cross-national research also implies that differences in institutional factors
influence that behavior. However, whether there are differences in the behavior of firms reporting
under the U.S. GAAP and IFRS asset impairment standards within the U.S. institutional setting
has not been examined.

III. INSTITUTIONAL SETTING AND HYPOTHESES
Institutional Setting
Cross-national research has found that the institutional setting influences firms’ reporting
incentives (Leuz et al. 2003; Daske, Hail, Leuz and Verdi 2008; Jeanjean and Stolowy 2008;
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Houqe, van Zijl, Dunstan and Karim 2012). This evidence appears consistent with the differential
findings on reporting behavior under IAS 36. Gordon and Hsu (2014) provide evidence suggesting
that the informativeness of asset write-downs depends on the institutional setting and Siggelkow
and Zülch’s (2013) evidence of income smoothing reporting behavior is consistent with
Germany’s institutional setting.
The institutional environment in the U.S. is based on a common law legal system with a large
equity market, strong investor protection rights and a strong legal enforcement system (LaPorta et
al. 1997 and 1998; Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki 2003). Burgstahler et al. (2006) find that strong legal
systems and capital market forces are associated with higher earnings quality suggesting that “the
first order effect of capital markets is to increase earnings informativeness” (p. 1013). Further, Ball,
Robin and Wu (2003) in an analysis of East Asian countries provide evidence that the market and
political forces forming a country’s institutional setting have a greater impact on financial
reporting quality than do high quality accounting standards.
However, Lang et al. (2006) provide evidence suggesting that the strong regulatory
environment in the U.S. does not override the effect of the home country reporting regime.
Examining reconciled earnings for U.S. listed foreign firms for the period 1991 – 2002; they find
that non-U.S. firms exhibit more earnings management than do U.S. firms. While they did not
specifically consider the effect of IFRS reporting they did find that their results held even for
foreign firms that reported using U.S. GAAP in their home country. Within the U.S. market we
also have evidence implying that the institutional setting is influencing financial reporting. Kim,
Li and Li (2012) find that U.S. listed firms reporting in accordance with IFRS without
reconciliation to U.S. GAAP have not experienced negative capital market consequences. Taken
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together this evidence leaves open the question of whether differences between U.S. GAAP and
IFRS are influencing reporting behavior within the U.S. setting.
We consider this question and add to this research by examining the asset impairment
reporting behavior of U.S. listed firms using accounting standards with recognized differences,
IAS 36 and ASC 360-10-35. Prior to the acceptance within the U.S. of IFRS for foreign private
issuers, reconciliations were required between U.S. GAAP and IFRS (20-F reconciliations).
Research examining these reconciliations provide evidence of significant differences between
reported net income under the two sets of standards during the 2004-2006 period, with long-lived
asset impairments being the second most common reconciliation category (Henry, Lin and Yang
2009). Examining a specific difference in accounting standards within the same institutional
setting allows us to add to the discussion over the influence of accounting standards and
institutional environment on financial reporting.
Hypotheses
We are interested in whether the U.S. GAAP and IFRS long-lived asset impairment standards
result in different firm reporting behavior in the U.S. setting. The U.S. is recognized as one of the
most shareholder-focused countries in the world with strong investor rights and legal enforcement
(Stout, 2012; LaPorta, et al., 1998). Therefore, this setting allows us to examine whether
differences in accounting standards influence reporting behavior within a strong institutional
environment. Ball et al. (2003) report evidence that the institutional setting has a stronger influence
on reporting behavior than high quality accounting standards, exogenously determined, within
weak investor protection environments. Leuz et al. (2003) find that investor protection is a more
influential determinant of earnings management behavior than accounting rules that are
endogenously determined. The U.S. setting is unique in that it provides a strong investor protection
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environment in which we may examine the differences between high quality accounting standards,
one developed within that environment (U.S. GAAP) and the other exogenously determined
(IFRS). The strong institutional environment provides a high level of assurance on the appropriate
application of the standards.
As described previously both standards seek to ensure that assets are not reported in financial
statements at more than their recoverable amount. However, there are two fundamental differences
between the asset impairment standards: the recoverability test required under U.S. GAAP but not
allowed under IFRS, and the reversal of impairment losses allowed under IFRS but prohibited
under U.S. GAAP. These differences in the standards may result in different reporting behavior
by U.S. listed firms. There is evidence that firms within the U.S. institutional environment
following U.S. GAAP are able to time the reporting of asset impairments to periods when earnings
are unexpectedly low, “big bath” behavior, but no evidence of income smoothing behavior (Riedl
2004). Outside of the U.S., there is evidence of both income smoothing and ‘big bath’ reporting
behavior associated with asset impairments by firms following IFRS (Dai, Deng, and Mao 2007;
Duh, Lee and Lin 2009; Siggelkow and Zülch 2013).
However, regardless of the differences in the standards, if the U.S. institutional environment
has a stronger influence on firm reporting behavior than accounting standards, then we would
expect to see similar reporting behavior between firms following U.S. GAAP and IFRS. To
investigate this expectation we examine the asset impairment reporting behavior of U.S. listed
firms and test the following hypotheses.
H1: There is no difference in the relation between long-lived asset impairment write-downs
and unexpectedly low earnings for U.S. GAAP reporting firms and U.S. listed IFRS
reporting firms.
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H2: There is no difference in the relation between long-lived asset impairment write-downs
and unexpectedly high earnings for U.S. GAAP reporting firms and U.S. listed IFRS
reporting firms.
If we find no difference in reporting behavior, it indicates that the U.S. institutional
environment is influencing reporting behavior or that regardless of the differences in the standards,
the reporting under the IFRS and U.S. GAAP standards is substantially equal. If however, we find
a difference in reporting behavior, ceteris paribus, it indicates that, within a strong institutional
environment, differences in accounting standards are influencing reporting behavior.
IV. SAMPLE SELECTION AND METHOD
Sample Selection
To develop the sample for our study, we identify all public companies within Compustat North
America recording a write-down from 2004 to 2012.4 We select only firms listed in the U.S. and
subject to U.S. financial reporting requirements. Prior to 2007, foreign private issuers listed in the
U.S. that reported in accordance with IFRS were required to provide reconciliations between IFRS
and U.S. GAAP in Form 20-F filings. Since 2007, foreign private issuers listed on U.S. stock
exchanges are no longer required to prepare reconciliations to U.S. GAAP if their financial
statements are prepared in accordance with IFRS as issued by the IASB.5 Thus IFRS financial
statements are available within the U.S. market providing a favorable setting for examining the
impact of differences in exogenously and endogenously determined reporting standards. 6 In

We use the Compustat item “WDP” which includes 1) Impairment of assets other than goodwill, and 2) Writedown/write-off of assets other than goodwill, which excludes impairment of goodwill and impairment of unamortized
intangibles. Therefore, it is possible the asset impairments include other amortizable intangible assets. However, while
this is a limitation of our study its effect is mitigated since the size of intangible assets (with either a definite or
indefinite life) other than goodwill (ITANO) is $248 ($0.56) million in mean (median) during our sample period while
total fixed assets is $1,241 ($24.0) million.
5
The SEC acceptance of financial statements prepared in accordance with IFRS as issued by the IASB was effective
for fiscal years ending after November 15, 2007.
6
A natural setting for the testing of our hypotheses would be to compare the U.S. GAAP write-down amount with the
IFRS write-down amount for the same U.S. listed IFRS reporting firms in the pre-2007 period where U.S. GAAP
reconciliations were required. However, when we reviewed the 20-F reconciliations for a sample of 33 of the 75 firm4
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developing the sample, we exclude companies which do not indicate the accounting standard that
was used and other missing data needed for our models. We include IFRS asset write-down firms
reported as having standards that are compliant with IFRS as required by the U.S. SEC.7 This
produces 7,478 potential firm-year observations, of which 578 are IFRS and 6,900 are U.S. GAAP
firm-year observations.
For our setting, we believe there could be two primary sources of potential selection bias. First,
a foreign incorporated firm’s decision to be cross-listed in the U.S. stock exchanges is not a random
decision. Second, a foreign firm which is cross-listed in U.S. stock exchanges also has to select an
accounting standard: U.S. GAAP or IFRS. This decision may not be a random decision, either.
Successfully controlling for these potential selection biases is critical to draw any meaningful
inferences from our results.8
To address the first selection bias issue, related to a foreign firm’s decision to be cross-listed
in the U.S. stock market, we adopt the two-stage approach suggested by Heckman (1979). In the
first stage, we model a firm’s decision to be cross-listed, and compute the Inverse Mill’s Ratio,
which is added as a control variable to the model to correct the selection bias in the second stage.

year write-downs in our pre-2007 sample period, we found that 20-F reconciliations either were not available (10
observations) or specific item reconciliation amounts for write-downs were not provided (22 observations). Due to
the lack of data we are unable to directly compare the write-down amount under U.S GAAP and IFRS for the same
firm.
7
IFRS data is presented at pre-reconciliation amounts in the Compustat North American database for fiscal years
ending prior to the SEC’s elimination of the 20-F reconciliation requirement. To confirm this claim, we took a sample
of 33 IFRS firms and compared their specific Compustat data with IFRS data from the firms’ Form 20-F filings.
Without exception, all Compustat data matched IFRS information.
8
Ideally, we would like to compare U.S firms that use U.S. GAAP to U.S. firms that use IFRS in the U.S. market.
This method will allow us to test the impact of accounting standards after controlling for the regulatory environment
and firms’ country of incorporation. There is very few cases, however, that U.S. incorporated firms that use IFRS in
the U.S. market during our sample period. As an alternative, our current research design compares the U.S. firms that
use GAAP and the non-U.S. firms that use IFRS in the same stock market. However, we acknowledge the limitation
of this matched sample approach because the U.S. firms and the non-U.S. firms are fundamentally different.
Consequently, even our matched sample approach and the Heckman’s two-stage approach can not completely rule out
the possibility that our results are driven by the fundamental difference between the U.S. vs. non-U.S. firms in the
U.S. stock markets.
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To address the second selection bias, related to a foreign firm’s decision to select between U.S.
GAAP versus IFRS, we compare IFRS asset write-down firm-years to their matched U.S. GAAP
asset write-down firm-years, generated by a propensity matching process (see Tucker 2010). Our
sample of foreign private issuers that report in accordance with IFRS in the U.S. is similar to those
matched U.S. firms that use U.S. GAAP in the U.S. in size (market capitalization), profitability
(ROA), and growth potential (book-to-market ratio). In the propensity matching procedure, we
first estimate a probability (or propensity score) that a firm will select IFRS with a given set of
firm characteristics (size, ROA, and book-to-market ratio). Then we identify a firm-year
observation with the closest probability within the U.S. GAAP asset write-down firm-years to
identify a matched firm-year observation.
Our matching procedure allows us to control for certain factors affecting management
incentives to manipulate earnings i.e., profitability and growth potential (Burgstahler and Dichev
1997; Barton and Waymire, 2004; Graham et al. 2005; Badertscher, 2011). There are other factors,
identified in prior research that may influence management incentives such as, CEO tenure and
type of CEO compensation contract (Matsunaga and Park 2001). However, this information is not
publically available for our sample firms.
In our matching procedure, we include industry and year of write-down in addition to the
propensity score in order to mitigate the impact of within industry and between year macroeconomic changes that may influence managerial incentives related to write-downs.9 Since we
match our U.S. GAAP and IFRS sample firm-years based on year of write-down and industry, we
expect that any exogenous shock, such as the financial crisis that occurred during our sample

9

Results from excluding the year of write-down from the sample matching process confirms our main results that is,
significant differences between U.S. GAAP and IFRS for the BATHINCENT (χ2=2.11, p=.07) and SMOOTHINCENT
(χ2=2.31, p=.06) variables.
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period, affects both groups (U.S. GAAP and IFRS reporting firms) equally with respect to their
reporting behavior.
The matching process resulted in 11 IFRS firm-year observations being eliminated because
we were unable to appropriately match them with U.S. GAAP firm-year observations. Our final
matched sample consists of 567 IFRS and 567 U.S. GAAP firm-year observations. Table 1
contains a summary of the sample selection process.10
[Insert Table 1]
Table 2 summarizes the demographics of the U.S. listed IFRS sample. Panel A of Table 2
reveals that Canada is the most represented country with 189 firm-year observations, over 33
percent of all IFRS firm-year observations in the sample. The United Kingdom is the next most
represented country with 74 firm-year observations, over 13 percent of all IFRS firm-year
observations in the sample. Panel B of Table 2 reveals that the year 2012 has more observations
in our IFRS sample than any other year; this is primarily a result of Canada requiring the use of
IFRS for listed firms beginning in 2011. Panel C reveals that the IFRS companies found in the
Compustat North America dataset represent diverse industries according to the Global Industry
Classification Standard (GICS). The most frequent industry among the IFRS firm-year
observations according to GICS is Materials, making up over 21 percent of the sample.
[Insert Table 2]
Method

10

Out of our sample of 567 IFRS firm-years, only 6 of the firm-years are voluntary adopters. This is consistent with
our sample composition where we have 5 firm-year observations in 2004, prior to the 2005 mandatory adoption of
IFRS in the European Union. Exclusion of voluntary adopters from our sample did not change the results substantively.
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We examine the validity of our sample matching process using univariate statistics to compare
the firm specific characteristics of the IFRS sample and the matched U.S. GAAP sample. We then
analyze the relation between write-downs and unexpectedly low and unexpectedly high earnings
for IFRS and U.S. GAAP firm-years separately using the following two-stage Heckman regression
model (Lennox, Francis, and Wang, 2012), adapted from Riedl (2004) and Francis et al. (1996).11
WDP_ATit = α + β1 BATHINCENTit + β2 SMOOTHINCENTit+ β3 ∆INDROAit
+ β4 ∆SALESit + β5 ∆OCFit + β6 logMARKETCAPit + β6 MILLSit + εit

(1)

where:
WDP_ATit = Firm i’s pre-tax asset write-off (reflected as a positive amount) for
period t, divided by total assets at the end of t-1;
BATHINCENTit = Firm i’s proxy for “earnings big bath” incentive, equal to the change in
firm i’s pre-write-off earnings from t-1 to t, divided by total assets at the
end of t-1, when this change is below the median of non-zero negative
values of this variable, and 0 otherwise;
SMOOTHINCENTit = Firm i’s proxy for “earnings smoothing” incentive equal to the change
in firm i’s pre-write-off earnings from t-1 to t, divided by total assets at
the end of t-1, when this change is above the median of non-zero
negative values of this variable, and 0 otherwise;
=
The
median change in firm i’s (2-digit SIC) industry ROA from period
∆INDROAit
t-1 to t;
∆SALESit = Firm i’s percent change in sales from period t-1 to t;
∆OCFit = Firm i’s change in operating cash flows from period t-1 to t, divided by
total assets at the end of t-1;
logMARKETCAPit = Firm i’s proxy for size, equal to natural logarithm of market
capitalization, calculated as fiscal-year closing stock price multiplied by
number of outstanding common shares for period t;
MILLSit = Firm i’s inverse Mills ratio estimated from the Heckman's selection
model
The dependent variable of the Heckman second-stage OLS model (1) is WDP_AT, which is
the pre-tax asset write-down (reflected as a positive amount) for period t, divided by total assets at
the end of t-1. In our model we include the variables, BATHINCENTit and SMOOTHINCENTit , to

11

Unlike Riedl (2004) and Francis et al. (1996) who use a Tobit regression model we use an OLS regression model
since we do not include non-write-down firms in our sample. However, the use of Tobit regressions did not change
our results. Further, we do not include a variable for change in earnings in our models because in our sample change
in earnings is highly correlated (over 69%) with both of our variables of interest, BATHINCENTit and
SMOOTHINCENTit , as such inclusion in the models results in high variance inflation factors indicating severe
multicollinearity producing unstable models.
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capture reporting incentives that may exist when earnings are unexpectedly low, “big bath”
incentives, and unexpectedly high, income smoothing incentives. BATHINCENTit is measured as
the change in pre-write-off earnings from the previous year, divided by total assets of the previous
year, when this change is below the median of non-zero negative values, and 0 otherwise. This
variable has a predicted negative sign. SMOOTHINCENTit is measured as the change in pre-writeoff earnings from the previous year, divided by total assets of the last year, when this change is
above the median of nonzero positive values, and 0 otherwise. The predicted sign of the
SMOOTHINCENTit variable is positive. These variables are constructed consistent with Riedl
(2004) and Francis et al. (1996). We estimate two separate regression models: one for the U.S.
GAAP sample and another for the IFRS sample, and test whether the coefficients for
BATHINCENTit and SMOOTHINCENTit obtained from each regression model are statistically
different using the Wald test (Judge et al. 1985).12
We include in our regression model ∆INDROAit capturing the effects of industry-specific
changes on asset write-downs since economic conditions in less robust industries may require more
asset write-downs than from firms in healthier industries. We measure this variable as the change
from prior year in median return on assets (ROA) in industry as grouped by two-digit SIC code.
We predict a negative association between write-downs (recorded as a positive amount) and
∆INDROAit. Next, we include two variables, ∆SALESit and ∆OCFit, to capture the effects of firmspecific performance changes on asset write-downs. ∆SALESit is measured as the percentage
change in sales of a firm from the prior year. ∆OCFit is measured as the change in operating cash
flows of a firm from the prior year, divided by the previous year total assets. We predict that both
variables will have negative signs. We also include logMARKETCAPit, Year Dummy, Country

12

Conducting one regression with an indicator variable for IFRS and U.S. GAAP firms and a fully interacted model
produces identical results.
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Dummy, and Industry Dummy in the model to control for the effect of firm size, year, industry, and
country, respectively. logMARKETCAPit equals the log of the firm’s market value, calculated as
fiscal-year closing stock price, multiplied by the number of outstanding common shares for the
year.13
To control for the selection bias regarding IFRS firm’s decision to be cross-listed in the U.S.
we conduct the Heckman two-stage procedure (Heckman 1979; Lennox, Francis, and Wang 2012).
We run our first stage model with IFRS firms’ decision to be cross-listed as the dependent variable
with a set of independent variables, identified by prior studies (Lang, et al. 2003). As well as
controlling for company size (logASSETS), leverage (LEVERAGE), and profitability (ROA), we
include the firm’s industry median Tobin's q (TOBINQ) and the country’s Gross Domestic Product
(GDP). We also include industry and year indicator variables to control for the cross-sectional
difference (e.g. the product market difference) and the fixed year effect. In addition, we include
an indicator variable for the country legal system (English, French, German, Scandinavian, and
others). From this first-stage model, we calculate the inverse Mill’s ratio, which is added to the
second-stage model (1) above.

V. RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics

13

The quality of the auditor may also influence reporting behavior. Therefore, we conducted a regression model
including an indicator variable based on size of the audit firm as a proxy for auditor quality, coded 1 for use of a Big
4 auditor and 0 otherwise. We found no significance for the audit quality variable and found very little impact on the
coefficient estimates for our other variables; the coefficients on BATHINCENTit and SMOOTHINCENTit were -.097
(t = 2.31, p < .05) and .183 (t = 2.64, p < .05) for the U.S. GAAP firms, respectively, and -.003 (t = -.06, p > .1) and
-.003 (t = -.08, p > .1) for the IFRS firms, respectively. We do not include the audit quality variable in the main
regression model because we do not have auditor data available for all firms resulting in a small reduction in our
sample size (n = 563 and n = 565, for IFRS and U.S. GAAP, respectively).
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Descriptive statistics on firm specific characteristics and the model variables for the IFRS and
U.S. firm-years observations in the matched sample are provided in Table 3. The univariate
comparison results presented in Table 3 support the validity of our sample matching selection
process. The matched U.S. GAAP sample is similar to the IFRS sample in size (market
capitalization), profitability (ROA), and growth potential (book-to-market ratio). Two-tailed t-tests
of mean difference reveal that for the measurements of earnings management, neither the indicator
of “big bath” reporting behavior (BATHINCENTit) nor income smoothing behavior
(SMOOTHINCENTit) is significantly (p < .10) different for U.S. GAAP firms as compared to IFRS
firms. We also find that size (measured by market capitalization), return on equity, and return on
assets are not significantly different between IFRS and U.S. GAAP firm-years.
[Insert Table 3]
Panels A and B of Table 4 present the Pearson and the Spearman correlation coefficients
among the model variables for the U.S. and the IFRS firm-year observations, respectively. Pearson
(Spearman) correlation coefficients are presented in the upper (lower) right diagonal in the table.
Examining the Pearson correlation coefficients, we find that the write-down amount (WDP_AT)
for U.S. GAAP firms is highly correlated with both the BATHINCENTit (-.209, p < .001) and
SMOOTHINCENTit (.295, p < .001) variables. Whereas, for IFRS reporting firms there is a much
lower correlation between WDP_ATit and the earnings management indicator variables,
BATHINCENTit (-.130, p < .01) and SMOOTHINCENTit (.116, p < .01). Based on this univariate
analysis, these correlations imply that there is a stronger relation between asset impairment writedowns and earnings management in U.S. GAAP firms than in IFRS firms. As expected the firm
financial performance variables, ∆SALESit and ∆OCFit, are significantly correlated across the IFRS
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and U.S. GAAP samples. These findings are consistent across both the Pearson and Spearman
correlation analyses.
[Insert Table 4]
Empirical Findings
Table 5 presents the multivariate regression analysis and comparison of coefficients
conducted to test whether there are differences in the asset write-down behavior of U.S. GAAP
and IFRS firms. For the IFRS firms, we report results from the two-stage Heckman model as well
as from the OLS model, following the suggestion from Lennox, Francis, and Wang (2012). The
amount of variation that is explained by the models as indicated by the adjusted R2 is 24% for the
U.S. GAAP model and 22% for the IFRS Heckman model.
For the U.S. GAAP firms, reported in column (1), the coefficient on the BATHINCENTit
variable (t-statistic = -4.68, p < .01) is significant and negative. Based on interpretation of similar
results from prior research (Riedl 2004) this result suggests that U.S. GAAP firms may be
recognizing asset write-downs in periods of unexpectedly low earnings implying “big bath”
behavior. In addition, the coefficient on the SMOOTHINCENTit variable is positive and significant
(t-statistic = 2.78, p < .01) suggesting that U.S. GAAP firms may be recognizing write-downs in
periods of unexpectedly high earnings implying income smoothing behavior. The size variable,
logMARKETCAPit, is negative and significant (p < .01) indicating an association between the size
of the firm and the write-down. Out of the two control variables structured to capture the effects
of firm-specific performance on asset write-downs, the coefficient on ∆SALESit is significantly
negative (t = -2.24, p < .05), while ∆OCFit reports only a marginally significant coefficient (t = 1.88, p < .10). These relations are consistent with the notion that a firm’s poor financial
performance is associated with asset write-downs. Overall, the U.S. GAAP findings suggest that
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the asset impairment standard in U.S. GAAP, ASC 360-10-35, may provide managers discretion
to opportunistically report impairment losses.
[Insert Table 5]
Our findings differ from those of Riedl (2004) on the behavior of U.S. firms in the post-SFAS
121 period. Riedl (2004) finds evidence of “big bath” reporting behavior but not of income
smoothing behavior based on his sample of 265 firm-year write-down observations from the post
SFAS 121, 1995 – 1998 period. Our full U.S. GAAP sample contains 5,425 firm-year write-down
observations from the 2004 - 2012 period. As discussed in the Additional tests section, when we
conduct the regression model for the full U.S. GAAP sample we find consistent results with our
matched sample, both the BATHINCENTit and SMOOTHINCENTit variables are significantly
associated with asset write-downs. This indicates that the difference with Riedl’s (2004) findings
may be due to differences in the model specifications,14 time period examined or the difference in
number of sample write-down observations. That is, given the size of our sample there are more
opportunities to observe both “big bath” and income smoothing behavior.
Column (4) in Table 5 reports the second stage of the Heckman model results for the IFRS
firms. Neither the coefficient on BATHINCENTit (t = 0.41), nor the coefficient on
SMOOTHINCENTit (t = 0.44) variable is significant. This finding suggests that the IFRS firms in
our sample are not using asset impairment write-downs to engage in earnings management
behavior. The size variable, logMARKETCAPit, is negative and significant (t = -6.00, p < .01),
consistent with our finding from the U.S. sample. None of the other control variables are

Our model specification is different from that of Riedl (2004) in that unlike Riedl’s model we do not include a
variable capturing the change in firm pre-write-off earnings (∆E) due to high correlations (over 69% in the U.S. GAAP
sample) between ∆E and BATHINCENT and SMOOTHINCENT. In addition Riedl includes both write-down and nonwrite-down firms in his regression model.
14
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statistically significant. Column (2) reports the results from the OLS model for the IFRS firms,
and the main results are consistent with those from the Heckman two-stage model. That is, neither
the BATHINCENTit, nor the SMOOTHINCENTit variable is significant.
We hypothesize that there is no difference in the association of long-lived asset impairment
write-downs and unexpectedly low or unexpectedly high earnings for U.S. GAAP firms as
compared to IFRS firms in the U.S institutional setting. To test these hypotheses we compare the
regression coefficients between U.S. GAAP and IFRS firms, using the Wald test. The results,
presented in Column (5) in Table 5, reveal that the association between BATHINCENTit and writeoffs for U.S. GAAP firms is significantly higher than for IFRS firms (χ2 = 3.68, p < .05). The
results, presented in Table 5, also reveal that the association between SMOOTHINCENTit and
write-offs for U.S. GAAP firms is significantly higher than for IFRS firms (χ2 = 5.55, p < .01).
These findings are not consistent with the hypotheses of no differences in H1 and H2.
Overall, our findings provide evidence that there is a difference in the write-off behavior for
U.S. listed firms following U.S. GAAP as compared to firms following IFRS within the U.S.
institutional environment. The association between asset impairment write-offs and “big bath” and
income smoothing reporting behavior in U.S. GAAP firms is significantly higher than that
observed in U.S. listed IFRS firms. U.S. GAAP firms appear to opportunistically time the writedown of asset impairments consistent with earnings management behavior whereas we find no
significant relation between write-downs in the period of unusually low or high earnings for IFRS
firms. Contrary to our hypotheses, our evidence implies that the differences in the asset impairment
standards are influencing firm reporting behavior within the U.S. It may be that U.S. GAAP and/or
IFRS reporting firms would react differently in other institutional environments. However, that
question is beyond the scope of this study.
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Additional Tests
Foreign Private Issuers Sample
To determine if unmeasured differences between U.S. domestic firms and foreign firms are
influencing our results, we compare the asset impairment reporting behavior of foreign firms that
use U.S. GAAP reporting in the U.S. (1,475 firm-year observations) to foreign firms that use IFRS
for U.S. reporting purposes.15 The results, presented in Table 6, are consistent with our sample of
U.S. domestic firms. That is, the association between both BATHINCENTit and
SMOOTHINCENTit and write-downs is significantly higher for foreign firms reporting in
accordance with U.S. GAAP than for foreign firms reporting in accordance with IFRS. Column
(5) in Table 6 reports that the association between BATHINCENTit and write-offs for foreign firms
that use U.S. GAAP in the U.S. is significantly higher than for foreign firms that use IFRS in the
U.S. (χ2 = 4.81, p < .05). In addition, the association between SMOOTHINCENTit and write-offs
for foreign firms that use U.S. GAAP is significantly higher than for IFRS firms, and this
difference is marginally significant at the 10 percent level (χ2 = 2.43, p < .1).
This result confirms our main finding in that the association between asset write-downs and
unexpectedly high and low earnings is stronger for firms that use U.S. GAAP as compared to those
that use IFRS within the U.S. institutional setting regardless of whether those firms are
incorporated within the U.S. or in a foreign country.16
[Insert Table 6]
Alternative Measures of Country Level Institutional Factors
15

We did not form a matched sample from foreign firms that use the U.S. GAAP reporting for the corresponding IFRS
firms because there are too few firm-year observations in each industry sector within the same year for the U.S. GAAP
reporting foreign firms’ sample, making it difficult to match a comparable U.S. GAAP firm for each IFRS firm.
16
We note that foreign private issuers that choose to use U.S. GAAP for reporting purposes within the U.S. have selfselected to use U.S. GAAP. We have not controlled for self-selection bias in our model due to the small number of
foreign firms that use IFRS, as discussed earlier. Therefore, while these results provide interesting information they
should be interpreted with this limitation in mind.
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It is also possible that while we controlled for country of origin within the regression analysis
there are similarities among countries in institutional factors that are influencing our results. To
determine if the country of origin of the foreign private issuers in our sample influences reporting
behavior, we categorize countries based on whether they are an outsider or insider economy. We
use this categorization since Leuz et al. (2003) observed significant cross-national differences in
earnings management behavior across these groups. Leuz et al. (2003) grouped countries into three
clusters based on similarities in their institutional characteristics identifying outsider economies
and two levels of insider economies. The countries in our sample fall into two categories. We
categorize Canada, Australia and the U.K., along with the U.S. as outsider economies with large
stock markets, strong legal enforcement and outsider rights. Whereas, the remaining countries in
our sample are classified as insider economies with smaller stock markets, a weaker investor
protection environment and a somewhat weaker legal enforcement environment as compared to
the outsider economies.
We conduct the regression analysis separately for the IFRS firms from outsider and insider
economies. We find results consistent with our full IFRS sample findings, the BATHINCENTit and
SMOOTHINCENTit variables are not significant for either country grouping. For the outsider
country sample, the coefficient on BATHINCENTit variable is 0.029 (p = 0.45) and on
SMOOTHINCENTit is -0.009 (p = -0.24). For the insider country regression, the coefficients on the
BATHINCENTit and SMOOTHINCENTit are -0.049 (p = -0.91) and 0.022 (p = 0.66), respectively.
Asset Impairment Reversals
Since asset impairment reversals are a distinguishing feature of IAS 36 that may influence
reporting behavior, we investigate whether the reversal of impairment losses, allowed under IFRS
but not under U.S. GAAP affects our main results presented in Table 5. To identify reversals of
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long-lived asset impairments we examined the 10-K and 20-F filings for the 567 IFRS firms
included in our sample.17 Through this process we obtained 63 observations of reversals.
We modified our main regression model (1) by adding a reversal variable, REVERSALit, and
two interaction variables, REVERSALit×BATHINCENTit and REVERSALit×SMOOTHINCENTit.
The REVERSALit variable is coded 1 if a firm has a reversal of a long-lived impairment loss during
our sample period and zero, otherwise. We present the results of this regression model in Table 7.
We find that the addition of these variables does not alter our main findings in Table 5. The
REVERSALit variable and the two interaction variables are not significantly associated with firms’
write-off amounts for our sample IFRS firms. Further, consistent with our main findings, the
coefficients on BATHINCENTit and SMOOTHINCENTit are also not significant.
[Insert Table 7]
IFRS Sample Composition
It is also possible that IFRS firms from Canada are influencing our results since they comprise
33.3% of our IFRS sample. To examine this possibility, we partition our IFRS sample into
Canadian and non-Canadian firms. We conduct the regression analyses, not reported, separately
for the Canadian and non-Canadian IFRS firms. In each sample group, the findings are consistent
with the full matched IFRS sample. That is, the BATHINCENTit and SMOOTHINCENTit variables
are not statistically significant for either Canadian or non-Canadian IFRS firms.18 Moreover, the
coefficients for BATHINCENTit and SMOOTHINCENTit between those two subsamples (i.e.

17

While companies typically disclose their reversal information in the PP&E footnote or in a separate section under
Impairment we searched the entire 10-K and 20-F filings of each firm for reversal data.

18

BATHINCENTit and SMOOTHINCENTit are t = .81 (p > .1) and t = -.27 (p > .1) for the Canadian firms, respectively;
and t = -1.36 (p > .1) and t = .91 (p > .1) for the non-Canadian firms, respectively.
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Canadian and non-Canadian IFRS firms) are not statistically different from each other indicating
that our results are not driven by the Canadian firms in our sample.
U.S. GAAP Firms
Another possible explanation for our results is that our matching process identified U.S.
GAAP firms with specific characteristics that are not generalizable to the U.S. GAAP population.
However, when we conduct the regression model for the full U.S. GAAP sample (5,425 U.S.
GAAP firm-year observations) we find consistent results, presented in Table 8, with our matched
sample, both the BATHINCENTit (t = -3.14, p < .01) and SMOOTHINCENTit (t = 3.94, p < .01)
variables are significantly associated with asset write-offs.
[Insert Table 8]
Macro-Economic Influence
The proxies used to capture macro-economic effects may also be influencing our results. In
our model, we include the dummy variables for each of our sample years (Year Dummy), to control
for macro-economic annual differences, while Riedl (2004) includes the percentage change in
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in his model. To determine if our results are affected by GDP we
include both variables, the change in GDP and the year dummy variables, and repeat our analysis.
We find that the change in GDP is not statistically significantly associated with firms’ write-off
amounts and no other inferences from our model change.19
Other Issues
We also incorporate capital expenditures and restructuring charges in our models as additional
control variables (results not reported) since these items may influence write-down behavior. The

19

Results from including the change in GDP in the regression models and conducting the comparison of the regression
coefficients between the U.S. GAAP and IFRS firms confirm our main results of significant differences on the
BATHINCENTit (χ2 = 2.57, p < .05) and SMOOTHINCENTit (χ2 = 6.15, p < .01) variables.
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inclusion of these two additional variables does not change our main results qualitatively. In
addition, as a robustness test, we use fixed assets instead of total assets in the matching process.
Analyses using this new matched control sample produce consistent results with our main findings.

VI. CONCLUSION
Prior research suggests that reporting incentives within specific institutional environments are
more important to accounting quality than accounting standards (Ball, Robin and Wu 2003;
Burgstahler, Hail and Leuz 2006). However, prior studies have not examined the effect of
differences between U.S. GAAP and IFRS within a strong institutional environment. In this study,
we examine whether the differences in impairment of long-lived asset accounting standards under
U.S. GAAP (ASC 360-10-35) and under IFRS (IAS 36) influence firms’ reporting behavior in the
U.S. setting, where reporting in accordance with U.S. GAAP is required for domestic companies
and in accordance with IFRS is allowed for foreign private issuers. To examine this issue we
identify U.S. GAAP and IFRS firms listed in the U.S. that have asset impairment write-downs
during the 2004 – 2012 period. From these firms we develop a matched sample of IFRS and U.S.
GAAP firms based on firm specific characteristics using propensity matching scores and industry
and year of write-down. We conduct univariate and multivariate analyses to examine the relation
between asset write-downs and unexpectedly low and unexpectedly high earnings (prior to writedowns) for our IFRS and U.S. GAAP firm-year observations while controlling for firm and
industry-level economic variables, as well as year of write-down and country. Additionally we
employ the Heckman two-stage model for our IFRS sample to mitigate any potential selection bias.
Overall, our evidence indicates that the association between “big bath” and income smoothing
behavior and asset write-downs is significantly higher for U.S. GAAP firms than for IFRS firms.
Since we limited our sample to firms listed in the U.S., controlled for firm specific economic
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factors, and matched our IFRS and U.S. GAAP firm-year observations, our evidence implies that
the difference in reporting behavior is associated with the difference in the asset impairment
standards. Given that prior research finds that, the institutional setting influences reporting
behavior our findings should be interpreted specific to the U.S. environment. These findings
should be of interest to financial statement users as they consider the impact of asset write-downs
on U.S. GAAP reported income, as well as the effect on comparisons between U.S. GAAP and
IFRS reported incomes that include asset write-downs.
Our findings suggest the possibility that IFRS motivates management to reflect the underlying
firm economics by requiring impairment write-downs based on discounted cash flows and reversal
of those write-downs when the asset’s economics change. Whereas the U.S. GAAP recoverability
test based on undiscounted cash flows, coupled with the prohibition on reversing impairment
losses provides both managerial discretion and incentives that allow for earnings management
behavior. This possibility is consistent with Riedl’s (2004) suggestion that “the issuance of a
‘brighter line’ standard, combined with (possibly increased) capital market pressures for achieving
earnings targets during the latter part of the 1990’s (e.g., Dechow and Skinner 2000), may have
enabled/driven managers to adopt more discretionary reporting choices under SFAS 121 relative
to before the standard” (p. 850).
Our results are specific to IFRS firms listed in the U.S. and are not generalizable to IFRS firms
listed outside of the U.S. where different institutional features may influence reporting behavior.
While this is a limitation of our study, it is also a strength in that we are able to compare the
behavior of firms following two different standards within the same institutional setting. Our study
is also limited to publically available information. As discussed in the paper there are differences,
in addition to the recoverability test and the provision for impairment reversal, that exist between
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IFRS and U.S. GAAP. However, access to the data required to quantify the effect of these
differences is not publically available.
Our study is subject to limitations. First, U.S. listed firms and foreign private issuers may be
fundamentally different, and this difference may drive our results. Table 6 in our robustness test
addresses this issue by comparing the asset impairment reporting behavior of foreign private
issuers using U.S. GAAP .to foreign private issuers using IFRS for U.S. reporting purposes.
However, we acknowledge that this test does not eliminate this concern. Second, our research
design focuses on a firm’s incentives to manipulate earnings and ignores the cost of earnings
management since the ex-ante cost of earnings management is unobservable. 20 Finally, even
though we have tried to hold managers’ incentive constant across U.S. GAAP and IFRS firms in
our research design, we cannot completely rule out the possibility that manager’s incentives from
reporting higher or lower earnings may be different for U.S. GAAP and IFRS firms, which can
drive different reporting behaviors as documented in this study.
Regardless of these limitations, we provide evidence that differences in accounting standards
result in differences in firms’ reporting behavior within strong institutional environments. These
findings should be of interest to accounting standard-setters as they consider the effectiveness of
specific reporting standards.

20

We thank the anonymous reviewer to bring these points to our attention.
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APPENDIX: Variable Definitions
WDP_ATit

=

BATHINCENTit

=

SMOOTHINCENTit

=

∆INDROAit

=

∆SALESit
∆OCFit

=
=

logMARKETCAPit

=

MILLSit
TOBINQit
logASSETSit
LEVERAGEit
ROAit

=
=
=
=
=

logGDPit
LAWENGLISHit

=
=

LAWFRENCHit

=

LAWGERMANit

=

LAWSCANDINit

=

LAWOTHERit

=

Firm i’s pre-tax asset write-down (reflected as a positive amount) for
period t, divided by total assets at the end of t-1;
Firm i’s proxy for “earnings big bath” incentive, equal to the change in
firm i’s pre-write-down earnings from t-1 to t, divided by total assets at the
end of t-1, when this change is below the median of non-zero negative
values of this variable, and 0 otherwise;
Firm i’s proxy for “earnings smoothing” incentive equal to the change in
firm i’s pre-write-down earnings from t-1 to t, divided by total assets at the
end of t-1, when this change is above the median of non-zero negative
values of this variable, and 0 otherwise;
The median change in firm i’s (2-digit SIC) industry ROA from period t-1
to t;
Firm i’s percent change in sales from period t-1 to t;
Firm i’s change in operating cash flows from period t-1 to t, divided by
total assets at the end of t-1;
Firm i’s proxy for size, equal to natural logarithm of market capitalization,
calculated as fiscal-year closing stock price multiplied by number of
outstanding common shares for period t;
Firm i’s inverse Mills ratio estimated from the Heckman's selection model;
Firm i’s industry median Tobin's q;
Natural log of firm i’s total assets;
Firm i’s leverage ratio, measured as total liabilities divided by total assets;
Firm i’s return on assets, measured as income before extraordinary items,
divided by total assets;
Natural log of firm i’s country Gross Domestic Product;
An indicator variable which takes value of 1 if firm i’s country has English
legal systems, 0 otherwise;
An indicator variable which takes value of 1 if firm i’s country has French
legal systems, 0 otherwise;
An indicator variable which takes value of 1 if firm i’s country has German
legal systems, 0 otherwise;
An indicator variable which takes value of 1 if firm i’s country has
Scandinavian legal systems, 0 otherwise;
An indicator variable which takes value of 1 if firm i’s country has other
legal systems, 0 otherwise.
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TABLE 1
Sample Selection

IFRS
Companies with total assets greater than zero
(Compustat North America, 2004-2012)
Eliminate companies that:
have no write-down data
have non-negative pretax write-down
have no recorded accounting standard
have missing regression variables
are listed on Canadian stock exchanges
IFRS and US GAAP companies with negative
asset write-downs
Foreign incorporated firms who use US GAAP
Final IFRS and US GAAP firms
Propensity score matching procedure:
IFRS and US GAAP firms with no matching
counterpart
Final sample used in the study (firm-year)

US
GAAP

Number of
Firm-Year
82,596

578

6,900

(71,926)
(266)
(17)
(2,697)
(212)
7,478

578

(1,475)
5,425

(1,475)
6,003

(11)
567

(4,858)
567

(4,869)
1,134

To develop our sample, we first identify all public companies within Compustat North America reporting a writedown (Compustat data item “WDP”) from 2004 to 2012. This produces 7,478 potential firm-year observations, of
which 578 are IFRS and 6,900 are U.S. GAAP firm-year observations. Then we identify a matched U.S. sample firmyear for each IFRS firm-year, using a propensity matching process. Our final matched sample consists of 567 IFRS
and 567 U.S. GAAP firm-year observations.
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TABLE 2
IFRS Sample Distribution
Panel A: Final IFRS Sample—By Country
Country
Canada
United Kingdom
Australia
France
Germany
Netherlands
Switzerland
South Africa
Finland
Sweden
Other
Total

No. of Firm-Years
189
74
32
31
29
21
19
18
14
9
131
567

Percent of Total Observations
33.3%
13.1%
5.6%
5.5%
5.1%
3.7%
3.4%
3.2%
2.5%
1.6%
23.1%
100.0%

Panel B: Final IFRS Sample—By Year
Year
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Total

No. of Firm-Years
5
39
31
34
53
46
56
133
170
567

Percent of Total Observations
0.9%
6.9%
5.5%
6.0%
9.4%
8.1%
9.9%
23.5%
30.0%
100.0%

Panel C: Final IFRS Sample—By Industry
GICS Code
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
Total

Industries
Energy
Materials
Industrials
Consumer Discretionary
Consumer Staples
Health Care
Financials
Information Technology
Telecommunication Services
Utilities

No. of
Firm-Years
61
119
47
69
50
66
35
41
52
27
567

Percent of Total
Observations
10.8%
21.0%
8.3%
12.2%
8.8%
11.6%
6.2%
7.2%
9.2%
4.8%
100%
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TABLE 3
Descriptive Statistics
U.S. Matched Companies
(N=567)
Variable
WDP_AT
BATHINCENT
SMOOTHINCENT
∆INDROA
∆SALES
∆OCFit
logMARKETCAP
Book-to-Market
ROA

Mean
0.020
-0.031
0.032
-0.003
0.084
0.008
7.080
0.922
-0.015

Median
0.004
0.000
0.000
-0.001
0.045
0.005
7.524
0.575
0.025

Std. Dev
0.054
0.082
0.094
0.012
0.378
0.087
2.625
1.247
0.172

IFRS Matched Companies
(N=567)
Mean
0.023
-0.026
0.033
-0.002
0.126
0.011
7.315
0.907
-0.022

Median
0.004
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.043
0.005
7.739
0.618
0.019

Std. Dev
0.058
0.065
0.088
0.014
0.476
0.085
2.831
1.027
0.175

Mean
Difference
-0.003
-0.005
-0.001
-0.005
-0.042
-0.003
-0.235
0.015
0.006

This table reports the summary statistics for the variables in our sample. The sample consists of 567 IFRS and 567
U.S. GAAP firm-year observations over the period 2004–2012. Variables are defined in the Appendix.
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively using two-sided t-test
for mean difference. None of the differences is statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
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TABLE 4
Pearson and Spearman Correlation Coefficients
Panel A: Pearson and Spearman Correlations for Matched U.S. GAAP Sample (n = 567)
Variable

WDP_AT

WDP_AT

BATHINCENT
SMOOTHINCENT
∆INDROA
∆SALES
∆OCF
logMARKETCAP

-0.274***
0.151***
-0.089**
-0.051
-0.080*
-0.440***

BATH
INCENT

SMOOTH
INCENT

-0.209***

0.295***
0.128***

0.260***
0.196***
0.234***
0.334***
0.345***

0.083**
0.194***
0.323***
-0.139***

∆INDROA

∆SALES

∆OCF

0.000
0.168***
0.024

-0.079*
0.087**
0.212***
0.113***

-0.095**
0.353***
0.343***
0.068
0.292***

0.160***
0.071*
0.137***

0.294***
0.157***

0.125***

∆INDROA

∆SALES

∆OCF

-0.053
0.042
0.035

0.009
0.050
0.165***
0.077*

0.032
0.128***
0.271***
0.065
0.141***

logMARKET
CAP

-0.314***
0.293***
-0.209***
0.081*
0.046
0.087**

Panel B: Pearson and Spearman Correlations for Matched IFRS Sample (n = 567)
Variable

WDP_AT

WDP_AT

BATHINCENT
SMOOTHINCENT
∆INDROA
∆SALES
∆OCF
logMARKETCAP

-0.214***
0.100**
-0.112***
-0.030
-0.004
-0.446***

BATH
INCENT

SMOOTH
INCENT

-0.130***

0.116***
0.150***

0.294***
0.061
0.150***
0.192***
0.248***

0.073*
0.177***
0.178***
-0.203***

0.091**
0.100**
0.110***

0.232***
0.023

logMARKET
CAP

-0.380***
0.289***
-0.306***
0.091**
-0.100**
-0.112***

-0.039

This table reports correlation coefficients between the variables in our sample. Pearson correlation coefficients are presented at the top-right half of the table; and
Spearman correlations are presented at the bottom-left half of the table. Variables are defined in the Appendix.
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively using two-sided t-statistics.
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TABLE 5
Asset Write-Downs and Unexpectedly High or Low Earnings: U.S. GAAP versus IFRS
Pred.
Sign

U.S. GAAP
OLS
(t-stat)
(1)
-0.100***
(-4.68)
0.185***
(2.78)
0.367***
(3.99)
-0.016**
(-2.24)
-0.066*
(-1.88)
-0.004***
(-6.21)

IFRS
OLS
(t-stat)
(2)
-0.005
(-0.11)
0.002
(0.06)
-0.049
(-0.36)
-0.002
(-0.27)
-0.012
(-1.45)
-0.010***
(-4.00)

IFRS Heckman
Difference
1st Stage
2nd Stage
Variables
(z-stat)
(t-stat)
(χ2-stat)
(3)
(4)
(5) = (1) -(4)
BATHINCENT
0.017
-0.117**
(0.41)
(3.68)
SMOOTHINCENT
0.010
0.175***
+
(0.44)
(5.55)
∆INDROA
-0.041
0.408**
(-0.31)
(3.25)
∆SALES
-0.001
-0.015
(-0.21)
(1.31)
∆OCF
-0.008
-0.058
(-1.05)
(1.81)
logMARKETCAP
-0.014***
0.010***
(-6.00)
(9.95)
MILLS
0.216***
(3.25)
TOBINQ
0.750***
(9.76)
logASSETS
0.245***
(31.46)
LEVERAGE
-0.551***
(-8.46)
ROA
-0.918***
(-15.58)
logGDP
0.003
(0.17)
LAWENGLISH
0.948***
(8.70)
LAWFRENCH
0.527***
(4.68)
LAWGERMAN
0.066
(0.57)
LAWSCANDIN
0.698***
(5.43)
LAWOTHER
1.364***
(7.28)
Intercept
0.057***
0.065***
-5.681***
0.025
(8.57)
(2.72)
(-12.88)
(1.15)
Year Dummy
Yes
Yes
Yes
Industry Dummy
Yes
Yes
Yes
Country Dummy
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observations
567
567
245,596
567
Adjusted R2
0.24
0.20
0.22
This table presents the multivariate regression analysis and comparison of coefficients conducted to test whether there
are differences in the asset write-down behavior of U.S. GAAP and IFRS firms. We estimate the regression models
using the pooled data over the period of 2004– 2012. The dependent variable is WDP_AT which is pre-tax asset writedown (reflected as a positive amount) for the year, divided by total assets for the prior year. All other variables are
defined in the Appendix. For IFRS firms, we report results from the two-stage Heckman model (shown in columns 3
and 4) as well as from the OLS model (shown in column 2). *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10 percent,
5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively, based on two-sided t-test.
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TABLE 6
Foreign Incorporated Firms Adopting U.S. GAAP versus IFRS in U.S.
Pred.
Sign
Variables
BATHINCENT

-

SMOOTHINCENT

+

∆INDROA

-

∆SALES

-

∆OCF

-

logMARKETCAP

-

U.S. GAAP
OLS
(t-stat)
(1)
-0.248**
(-2.45)
0.107
(1.63)
0.109
(1.15)
0.004
(1.32)
-0.087
(-1.36)
-0.004***
(-3.67)

IFRS
OLS
(t-stat)
(2)
-0.001
(-0.03)
-0.004
(-0.16)
-0.054
(-0.40)
-0.002
(-0.23)
-0.009
(-0.36)
-0.010***
(-3.95)

0.041***
(2.79)
Yes
Yes
Yes
1,475
0.11

0.069***
(2.75)
Yes
Yes
Yes
567
0.20

MILLS
TOBINQ
logASSETS
LEVERAGE
ROA
logGDP
LAWENGLISH
LAWFRENCH
LAWGERMAN
LAWSCANDIN
LAWOTHER
Intercept
Year Dummy
Industry Dummy
Country Dummy
Observations
Adjusted R2

IFRS Heckman
1st Stage
2nd Stage
(z-stat)
(t-stat)
(3)
(4)
0.017
(0.41)
0.010
(0.44)
-0.041
(-0.31)
-0.001
(-0.21)
-0.008
(-1.05)
-0.014***
(-6.00)
0.216***
(3.25)
0.750***
(9.76)
0.245***
(31.46)
-0.551***
(-8.46)
-0.918***
(-15.58)
0.003
(0.17)
0.948***
(8.70)
0.527***
(4.68)
0.066
(0.57)
0.698***
(5.43)
1.364***
(7.28)
-5.681***
0.025
(-12.88)
(1.15)
Yes
Yes
Yes
245,596
567
0.22

Difference
(χ2-stat)
(5) = (1) -(4)
-0.265**
(4.81)
0.097*
(2.43)
0.150
(0.60)
0.005
(0.28)
-0.079*
(2.31)
0.010***
(9.01)

This table presents the multivariate regression analysis and comparison of coefficients conducted to test whether there
are differences in the asset write-down behavior of foreign firms that use U.S. GAAP reporting in the U.S. to foreign
firms that use IFRS for U.S. reporting purposes. We estimate the regression models using the pooled data over the
period of 2004– 2012. The dependent variable is WDP_AT. All variables are defined in Appendix. For IFRS firms,
we report results from the two-stage Heckman model (shown in columns 3 and 4) as well as from the OLS model
(shown in column 2). *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively,
based on two-sided t-test.
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TABLE 7
The Reversals of Asset Write-Downs for IFRS Firms
Variables

Pred. Sign

BATHINCENTit

-

SMOOTHINCENTit

+

∆INDROAit

-

∆SALESit

-

∆OCFit

-

logMARKETCAPit

-

REVERSALit
REVERSALit×
BATHINCENTit
REVERSALit×
SMOOTHINCENTit
MILLSit

IFRS
OLS
(t-stat)
0.004
(0.08)
0.002
(0.06)
-0.031
(-0.21)
-0.003
(-0.33)
-0.010
(-0.37)
-0.010***
(-3.94)
-0.001
(-0.06)
-0.067
(-0.74)
-0.070
(-0.75)

TOBINQ
logASSETSit
LEVERAGEit
ROAit
logGDPit
LAWENGLISHit
LAWFRENCHit
LAWGERMANit
LAWSCANDINit
LAWOTHERit
Intercept
Year Dummy
Industry Dummy
Country Dummy
Observations
Adjusted R2

IFRS Heckman
1st Stage
2nd Stage
(z-stat)
(t-stat)

0.067***
(2.72)
Yes
Yes
Yes
567
0.20

0.026
(0.50)
0.010
(0.47)
-0.022
(-0.16)
-0.002
(-0.34)
-0.005
(-1.24)
-0.014***
(-5.91)
-0.001
(-0.20)
-0.073
(-0.55)
-0.096
(-1.17)
0.216***
(3.25)
0.750***
(9.76)
0.245***
(31.46)
-0.551***
(-8.46)
-0.918***
(-15.58)
0.003
(0.17)
0.948***
(8.70)
0.527***
(4.68)
0.066
(0.57)
0.698***
(5.43)
1.364***
(7.28)
-5.681***
(-12.88)

245,596

0.025
(1.15)
Yes
Yes
Yes
567
0.22

This table presents the multivariate regression analysis to test whether asset impairment reversals may influence the
asset write-down behavior of foreign firms that use IFRS for U.S. reporting purposes. We estimate the regression
models using the pooled data over the period of 2004– 2012. The dependent variable is WDP_AT. The variable,
REVERSAL, is coded 1 if a firm has a reversal of a long-lived impairment loss during our sample period and zero,
otherwise. All other variables are defined in Appendix. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10 percent, 5
percent, and 1 percent, respectively, based on two-sided t-test.
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TABLE 8
U.S. GAAP Firms – The Entire Population

Variables
BATHINCENTit

Predicted
Sign
-

SMOOTHINCENTit

+

∆INDROAit

-

∆SALESit

-

∆OCFit

-

logMARKETCAPit

-

Intercept
Year Dummy
Industry Dummy
Country Dummy
Obs
Adjusted R2

U.S. GAAP
OLS
(t-stat)
-0.112***
(-3.14)
0.077***
(3.94)
-0.038
(-0.48)
0.007*
(1.73)
-0.067***
(-3.14)
-0.006***
(-10.85)
0.074***
(5.46)
Yes
Yes
Yes
5,425
0.10

This table presents the multivariate regression analysis using the full U.S. GAAP sample (5,425 U.S. GAAP firm-year
observations). We estimate the regression model using the pooled data over the period of 2004– 2012. The dependent
variable is WDP_AT. All variables are defined in Appendix. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10 percent,
5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively, based on two-sided t-test.
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